Thursday, March 19, 2009

Nietzsche and Moral Psychology

Moral Psychology is the study of the psychological conditions and preconditions that enable us to act as moral beings. Throughout history, most thinkers have been occupied with defining right and wrong, good and evil. Moral psychology inquires into the part of the human psyche that allows for these concepts to even exist. Thus, instead of asking, “What is right and wrong?” a moral psychologist would ask, “what do we know about human psychology that informs our understanding of right and wrong as well as our ability (or inability) to live according to those principles?” Traditionally, this branch of ethics has been dominated by a handful of philosophers, a club into which Nietzsche has only recently been included.

Of course, as Christians, this branch of study is immensely relevant to our theology, especially our understanding of the doctrines of sin and sanctification. In the reformed tradition, sin is universal and humans are totally depraved. “There is no one righteous, not even one” (Rom 3.10) means that humans lack the ability to live morally apart from the transforming knowledge of the gospel and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. This is a radical claim and is a difficult one for non-believers to accept. Certainly no one likes to be told he or she is unable to be a good person apart from becoming a Christian. I am interested in identifying a moral psychology that would provide a naturalistic explanation for this doctrine.

In this article, I will very briefly outline the beliefs of four of the most prominent moral psychologists. I argue that of these four thinkers, Friedrich Nietzsche provides the most tenable system through which sin and sanctification can be explained.

 

The differences between all these moral systems can be boiled down to two issues: The nature of moral principles within an individual and how it motivates one to make moral decisions.

Some argue that the first moral psychologist was Aristotle. According to him, one makes moral decisions based on a “firm and unalterable character”. This character is a complex system of sentiments and emotional responses that determine how an individual acts in specific situations. In order to develop a morally positive disposition, one must practice making moral decisions in order to develop them into habits. These habits contribute to the individual’s entire life, allowing them to exercise proper emotional responses and to reflect intelligently on their inner motives. For Aristotle, the most important factor in developing a virtuous person is his or her childhood upbringing. Thus, one’s parents and childhood educators make the most difference in one’s moral training.

The great skeptic David Hume takes this a step further. He claims that moral nature doesn’t exist and all seemingly moral decisions are simply choices made out of emotion. For Hume, we have no inner moral nature; all our moral actions are motivated by our environmentally-produced psychological affections and aversions. In other words, there is no independently existing law of morality; all that matters in your determination of what is right and wrong is what pleases you and what disgusts you.

For Kant, moral law exists and it can be attained by pure reason. His famous Categorical Imperative (CI) is what he believes to be the universal law by which all rational moral people must live. The CI is obeyed by rationally reflecting individuals; moral motivation has nothing to do with an individual’s nurture or environment. If a person chooses certain actions out of habit that just happen to coincide with moral good, he did not actually make a moral decision. Rather, each time an individual is faced with a moral decision, he or she must choose the right one solely through his rational faculties. Kant calls this motivation the concept of duty.

Nietzsche’s moral psychology goes radically against any of the previous three thinkers. For Nietzsche, what is definitive in determining an individual’s actions is neither habit, emotion, nor reason, but hereditary psychological and physiological traits. He believes that the vast majority of the time people first behave in a certain way and then form moral principles to justify that. The primary determinant of each individual’s behavior is his or her unique genetic stamp, which give that person certain behavioral traits that are very hard to stray away from. Brian Leiter, a prominent Nietzsche scholar, summarized this in the “Doctrine of Types”, which states: “Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which defines him as a particular type of person” (Leiter 2008). Leiter calls this psycho-physical constitution a “type-fact” and it is a system of unconscious drives and instincts within an individual.

Of course, this is not to say that one’s upbringing and socio-cultural situation does not factor into his morals. There is a complex interplay of nature and nurture, but Nietzsche claims that nurture is far more important. This is backed up by most of the scientific data from the last few decades. It is surprising, but the fact of the matter is in recent psychology research, the idea that parental upbringing is a big factor in the moral development of an individual is going out the door. Nor is this doctrine claiming that humans are incapable of rationally reflecting on their actions. It simply states that most of the time we act first and ask questions later.

 

At first glance, Nietzsche’s claims may seem antagonistic towards Christianity. If our ability to choose right over wrong is already set in stone based on our genetic makeup, how can we have any hope for sanctification? Apart from a supernatural explanation involving the work of the Holy Spirit, it would be impossible for an individual to align his or her moral disposition towards that of Christ’s. Furthermore, how can we be held responsible for our actions, if they have been determined for us since the day we were born by forces beyond our control?

In addressing this last objection, Nietzsche does not claim that all a person’s actions are determined for him from birth in a fatalistic fashion. In fact, his writings scathingly denigrate the deterministic way of viewing the world. He believes that our actions are not primarily determined by rational reflection, but by our unconscious drives and instincts, which have been inhibited by our false conceptions of divinely-imposed moral law.

I think the fact that we are helpless in our genetic disposition towards moral wrong actually comports really well with the sin doctrine. Reformed theology states that in our actions we are completely unable to do good. This is scientifically tenable if we can show that our inability to do good is rooted in a universal defect in our type-facts. According to the reformed theologian Wayne Grudem, humankind’s fall into sin involves a fall in all dimensions of human life, including “our intellects, our emotions and desires, our hearts (the center of our desires and decision-making processes)…and even our physical bodies” (Grudem, Systematic Theology). If the center of our desires and decision-making processes is equated with type-facts, our unique set of behavioral traits, then a fall in that facet of our lives could explain the universal inability of all humans to live morally.

Given this explanation, there is still the difficulty of giving a naturalistic account of sanctification. Perhaps at this point it is appropriate to remember that as humans, we are limited in our intellectual capacity and that it is perhaps not inappropriate to say that the Holy Spirit works by supernatural means. After all, our redemption is not a redemption simply of our spirits, but of our entire bodies in Christ. If, upon accepting Christ as our Lord and Savior, there is a tangible change in our lives, perhaps the change involves a change in the plasticity of our type-facts, enabling us to make morally positive decisions and live “by the fruits of the Spirit”, so to speak.

I am particularly interested in Nietzschean ethics because I believe that it has much to add to our Christian understanding of ourselves and the of human condition . I believe that over history, the person of Nietzsche has been unjustly vilified in Christian circles because of his infamous claim that “God is dead”. Over the last century, his writings have been misunderstood, partially because of its difficulty and partially because of its (incorrect) association with Nazi doctrine. Through this mistreatment and the tendency to construct straw-man understandings of his claims, a Christians have largely left a wealth of deep spiritual insight unmined. It is my hope that we would be able to reexamine the thoughts of this intellectual giant, and use them to build up our spiritual understanding.

 

Sola Deo Gloria

Daniel Shih

5 comments:

  1. A good article - I suspected Daniel's hand in this from the moment I read 'Wayne Grudem'. I have many (mostly emotional) disagreements with a view that God would truly predestine us for Hell. If we are bound by our scientifically pre-determined wills and the only hope for redemption is to be chosen by God then who is to blame for my sin? Why did he create Sinner X as a 'vessel of wrath' for His own glory and who is to blame for X's sin? So before you start hastily typing in the Comment box that this is the Genetic Fallacy, please read on.

    What troubles me are Christians who want to use the Cosmological Argument to say that God is the origin of all causes in an effort to prove God's existence (and I am assuming many reading this will believe this to be true). Frankly, it strikes me that saying God is the First Cause - the prime mover of the chain of events - and saying we are "helpless in our genetic disposition towards moral wrong," leds to a view that God is responsible for our sin. So continue to accuse me of a Genetic Fallacy if you must, but I think this is quite accurate. Summary: If you want to use the Cosmological Argument (which you have not been doing, so I'm not accusing you) and hold to strict scientific determinism, all the while maintaining a Christian world view of the matter, you are trying quite vainly to have your cake and eat it too.

    - Patrick Welsh

    ReplyDelete
  2. I think one of the benefits of getting into a Christian moral psychology is that it addresses precisely Patrick's problem. I think, in general, most causally deterministic Christian arguments also depend upon a view of the human person as somewhat qualitatively different from the rest of matter. The imago Dei somehow allows humans to have apperception and thus some sort of ability to ground morality in that which is not already causally determined. Leibniz could be seen this way. The assumption does not seem to pan out when considernig the "what" of the Imago Dei, but it can at least be defended.

    Dan, I agree that Nietzsche's moral philosophy may lend itself better to a Christian understanding of fall/redemption, but do you think Nietzsche himself would ever even entertain arguments concerning redemption into an absolute standard of good? In other words, he can beat up on Aristotle, Hume and Kant, but overall doesn't moral psychology, if taken only by itself, refuse the absolute standards of Christ's goodness, and replace it merely with different power plays (i.e. the will to power)?

    -Steve Armandt

    ReplyDelete
  3. 1) Steve, would you please quote whatever of Leibniz struck you as a defense of your view because last I checked, his atomistic 'monadology' leads to results quite opposite to your own once we take into account this problem: our minds are entirely physical.

    But any discussion further is hopeless as it will soon degress into a 'you're a reductionist'/'you're delusional' ad hominem arguement. Suffice it to say that I think you are entirely wrong.

    2) I think you are right on with your response to Dan.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Whoops, one more challenge: how is an a priori dogmatic metaphysical ethical system even possible? And even if it were, what is to say we can even arrive at such knowledge?

    - Patrick Welsh

    ReplyDelete
  5. Patrick,

    To say that a "mind" is entirely physical seems to discount the entirety of his monadology. "Simples" constitute reality and anything considered "physical" would not consist of anything simple. Leibniz' idealism accounts for the "physical" perception of reality as displayed to the monad, and not the existence of the monad itself. The difference with humans is that they can be aware of such a state through apperception. This general tendency of awareness is the faculty I am referring to that could be considered something which grounds morality. So, we cannot take into account the problem of "physical minds" in Leibniz because he rejects it flatly.

    I won't be defending this view dogmatically since I don't really know much about Leibniz. Still, I don't think you could ever paint Leibniz as a "physicalist". To say that a monad is predetermined to apperceive the way it does is another story, but that gets more into dogmatic idealism than moral psychology.

    I was just saying there is a possibility of defense for a Christian to account for "something else" in moral psychology based in the image of God.

    ReplyDelete